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Abstract
Political events matter in economics. This paper uses the 2011 political
standoff over the rise of the US debt ceiling to characterise an instrument
that is then used to estimate the impact of sovereign on bank credit risk.
Results show that a 100 basis points increase in the US sovereign default risk
implies a 41 basis points increase in bank credit risk; this effect is about three
times larger than the corresponding effect of bank default risk on sovereigns.
Finally, calculations suggest that during the first two quarters of 2011, as a
consequence of the debt ceiling crisis, US bank funding costs increased by
approximately 18 basis points.
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1. Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis was so disruptive for the financial system to force
many sovereigns to re-capitalise their banks. In many instances, the imple-
mentation of state bailout programs put public finances under severe strain,
ultimately increasing government default risk. If in the onset of the global
financial crisis credit risk spread primarily from banks to governments, the
2010 European sovereign debt crisis was a powerful reminder that credit risk
can also go the opposite way, as the exposure to sovereign bonds of troubled
economies represented a significant source of credit distress for financial in-
termediaries. Despite improved financial conditions, the characterisation of
the link between sovereign and bank credit risk is still today an important
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ingredient for understanding financial and fiscal vulnerabilities; the political
turmoil that followed the Italian elections in March 2018 was accompanied
by a repricing of sovereign risk and by a sharp sell-off in Italian sovereign
bond markets. Debt market tensions then spilled over to financial interme-
diaries, evidence of a resurgent doom doom loop, the sovereign−bank credit
risk nexus.
Higher sovereign default risks can transfer to banks via a number of chan-
nels. First, mark-to-market valuations of sovereign bonds generate impair-
ment losses on trading books that weaken bank balance sheets (market risk).
Second, a higher default risk may also require making provisions for losses on
sovereign assets held to maturity. Third sovereign stress transmits to banks
by reducing the credit quality of other banks assets that are indirectly af-
fected by a sovereign default. Theoretical representations of bank-sovereign
credit linkages are numerous. For example sovereign−bank feedback loop
models are discussed by Acharya et al. (2014), Brunnermeier et al. (2016),
Cooper and Nikolov (2013), Farhi and Tirole (2016), Gennaioli et al. (2014),
and Leonello et al. (2014). Empirical investigations are no less profuse, but
in general only mildly try to deal with the endogeneity issue entailed in this
relationship; Altavilla et al. (2017) use monthly data for euro area banks
from 2007 to 2015 to find that, in vulnerable countries, publicly owned, re-
cently bailed out banks significantly amplified the transmission of risk from
the sovereign via subdue lending. Alter and Schu¨ler (2012) investigate the
interdependence of the default risk of several euro area countries and their
domestic banks, they find that in the period before bank bailouts the con-
tagion disperses from bank credit spreads to sovereign credit default swaps
(CDSs). Alter and Beyer (2014) try to quantify spillovers between sovereign
credit markets and banks in the euro area. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) inves-
tigate contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the
period 2007 to 2012. Albertazzi et al. (2014) examine the implications of
the sovereign debt tensions on the Italian credit market during the sovereign
debt crisis. The authors find that the sovereign spreads significantly affects
the cost of credit for firms and households and exerts a negative effect on
loan growth. Similar results are found by Zoli (2013). De Marco (2017) and
Popov and Van Horen (2013) use data from the EBA stress test to show that
banks with larger sovereign exposure raised anding rates more sharply and
decreased their access to wholesale funding. Acharya et al. (2018) use syndi-
cated loan data to investigate the loan contraction caused by the sovereign
crisis. Finally, Becker and Ivashina (2017) find crowding out effects due to
high bank exposure to sovereigns on lending to corporates.
However, the inherit identification problem that characterises the simul-
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taneous relationship between sovereign and bank credit risk has hampered
a convincing quantification of the causal relationship between the two. This
paper tries to fill this gap by proposing a simple identification scheme based
on instrumental variables. The idea is to use the political events relating
to the 2011 US debt ceiling crisis as a base for the characterisation of an
instrument for US sovereign credit risk. Recent events, including the U.K.
2016 referendum on the EU membership, are potent reminders that politi-
cal events may have severe impact on financial markets and macroeconomics
variables. This paper shows that the political struggle opposing the White
House and the US Congress for the rise of debt ceiling in the first quarters
of 2011 had a non-negligible impact on US government CDSs. Exogenous
to innovations in bank credit risk, the events characterising the debt ceiling
crisis provide a source of variation for the US sovereign default risk that
can be used for the identification for the causal effect of sovereign on bank
default risk. The discussion that follows describes how to construct an in-
strument for sovereign default risk out of the debt ceiling political timeline
and presents results for the estimated impact of government credit risk on
bank CDSs. The last section discusses conclusions and policy implications.
2. Empirics: anatomy of the bank-sovereign credit risk relation-
ship
Let us consider the following model describing the relationship between
bank and sovereign credit risk
st = βsqt + γZs,t + vs,t (1)
qt = βqst + δZq,t + vq,t (2)
where st is a measure of default risk for banks at time t, qt is the corre-
sponding measure for sovereigns; Zs,t and Zq,t are two vectors of exogenous
controls, possibly including a constant. This representation essentially states
that the two endogenous variables, qt and st, are jointly determined in a si-
multaneous equations model. If Zs,t = Zq,t = Zt the system is unidentified
and a simple OLS estimation of Equation (1) would produce biased and
inconsistent estimates of βs − the target coefficient measuring the impact
of sovereign on bank credit risk. However if Zs,t 6= Zq,t, meaning if the
set of exogenous variables is not the same for both equations and if there
is at least one element zit in Zq,t not in Zs,t, the identification of Equation
(1), and thus of βs, is possible. The conditions that must hold for each
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generic excluded instrument zit in Zq,t are E(z
i
t, ut) = 0, E(z
i
t, vt) = 0 and
E(zit, qt) 6= 0, which implies δi 6= 0.
In practice, it is not straightforward to think of an exogenous determi-
nant of sovereign credit risk that is not also a determinant of bank default
probability. Traditional identifying assumptions based on covariance restric-
tions are unlikely to hold in this case, as inconsistent with the simultaneous
nature of the relationship between the two endogenous variables. This paper
proposes to solve the identification problem entailed in Equations (1) and
(2) with an instrumental variable approach. The following sections describe
how we can exploit a political event, the 2011 US political struggle referred
as the debt ceiling crisis, for the construction of an instrument of sovereign
credit risk that is exulted from Equation (1) but that had an impact on
sovereign default risk. Calling this instrument zjt , the crucial intuition justi-
fying the exclusion restriction E(zjt , vt) = 0 is that the disagreement between
the House of Representatives and the White House over the possibility of
an increase of the US debt ceiling was not affected by credit conditions in
the banking system.
3. Identification, the debt ceiling political timeline
On November 2nd, 2010 the Republicans won control of the House of
Representatives on a promise to scale back government spending and tackle
the high fiscal deficit. This event set the stage for a political battle be-
tween Democrats and Republicans that took place six months after and
that brought the US government few steps away from default. The fulcrum
of this political struggle was the rise of the US debt ceiling, a legislative limit
on the amount of national debt that can be issued by the US Treasury. In
January 2011 the Treasury estimated that US borrowing needs could push
the amount of debt past the legal borrowing limit of 14.294 trillion USD
sometime between March 31 and May 16. Failing to raise the debt ceiling
before these dates would cause a technical default for the US Government.
The timeline of this political crisis developed along a number of crucial votes,
key meetings and political declarations having an impact on the short-term
default risk for US government bonds (Table .1). Within the framework of
the analysis developed in this paper, the variation induced by this political
clash on US government CDSs is used as an exogenous source of variation
for US sovereign default risk. This in order to solve the identification prob-
lem described by Equation (1) and (2). The exclusion restriction required
for a correct IV identification strategy holds under the assumption that the
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political clash between Republicans and Democrats was not affected - at
least on daily frequencies - by other economic or financial factors.
The first step for the construction of an instrument from the timeline
reported in Table .1 is to interpret the expected effect of each episode on
US sovereign default; the second column in Table .1 provides a description
of each event in the timeline, the last column shows the expected impact on
US government CDSs. The expected impact on US sovereign default risk
is postulated under the premise that persistent or widening disagreement
among the parties hampered the achievement of the political agreement
necessary for rising the debt ceiling and, through this, endanger the ability
of the US government to stay solvent.
Figure .1 shows the evolution of 1,2 and 5 year, USD denominated, US
government CDSs over the first half of 2011, against key dates identified
in Table .1; red (green) vertical lines mark episodes that are interpretable
as increasing (decreasing) credit risk. From a graphic inspection two facts
stand out: first, US governments CDSs appear to spike in some crucial
dates identified by the debt ceiling timeline. Second, the price of short term
CDSs appears to be more sensitive than the one of 5 year contracts. Also,
volatility in CDSs markets increases significantly after May 2011, when the
debt ceiling debate takes the connotation of a crisis. From July to the
beginning of August 2011 an inversion the CDS curve can be observed,
implying a higher cost for buying credit protection in the short and showing
markets’ fear for a shock default.1
The construction of a numeric variable form the timeline presented in
Table .1 is not straightforward; the simplest choice is to create a dichotomous
variable z1 (z2) assigning a value of one to each date identifying events
showing disaccord (accord) among Democrats and Republicans about rising
the debt ceiling, and zero otherwise. An alternative is the construction a
unique variable (let us call it z3) assigning two possible values (-1 and 1) to
events signalling accord and disaccord among the parties. Thus z3 is defined
as z2 - z1. Both these solutions are tested in the empirical specifications that
follow. In both cases the resulting variables do not convey the intensity that
diverse events in the timeline may have on US CDSs. In the second case (a
unique instrument) symmetry is also assumed between events increasing and
reducing US government CDSs. This condition does not affect the correct
assessment of the coefficient β in Equation (1), while the use of a unique
instrument brings the benefit of an accrued estimation efficiency.
1This was the first ever recorded inversion of the US sovereign CDS curve.
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4. Estimation and results
The baseline specification is
st = βsqt + φsqt−1 + ρsst−1 + γΩ(t;t−1) + ζt (3)
where st is a variable representing 5 year bank CDSs. This variable
is computed as the median of 5 year, USD CDSs for the first 6 US banks
by asset size;2 qt is the 5 year, USD US government CDS.
3 Ω is a vector of
controls including the log of the VIX index and the Baa Aaa rated corporate
bond spread, two proxies for investor risk appetite and kwon determinants
of the price of insurance against default risk. The model also includes a set
of time fixed-effects defined a quarterly frequency. The use of quarter fixed-
effects enable to control for low frequency macroeconomic variables that may
affect both dependent and independent variables. One lag of two endogenous
variables st and qt and of the vix index are introduced to eliminate serial
correlation.
Regression results are reported in Table .2. The first column shows
results for a simple OLS estimation, the second and forth columns show
results for an IV-GMM estimation where key identifying conditions are ob-
tained using the set of instruments discussed above. Columns 3 and 5 show
corresponding first step estimations. In all IV specifications, the instru-
ment performs well and identification appears to be solidly achieved: the
Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) rank LM underidentification statistics suggests the
existence of significant correlation between the instrument and the endoge-
nous variable; at the same time, a high value for the K-P Wald F-statistic
allows to rule out the possibility that the estimated IV coefficient could be
biased toward the corresponding OLS due to weak identification. The target
coefficient β identifying the effect of government CDS on bank credit risk is
positive and significant in all IV specifications. A quantitative assessment
suggests that a 100 basis points increase in the US sovereign default risk
implies a 41 basis points increase in median bank credit risk.4 This effect
2Among these JP Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America, Wells Fargo & Co., Citigroup
Inc., Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, representing over 60 percent of the overall US
banking industry by assets in 2017.
3The choice of using USD denominated CDS with respect to the more liquid EUR
denominated, responds to the necessity of eliminating possible exchange rate effects form
the analysis. Similarly, the use of 5 year CDS, with respect to 1 or 2 year contracts,
that, as shown, appeared to be more volatile during the the period of analysis, is more
appropriate to eliminate the possible impact of term spreads.
4Considering the model with a single instrument.
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compares with an effect of 52 basis points found by a simple OLS estimation.
Considering point estimates this means over 3/4 of the observed correlation
between bank and sovereign CDS is due to the impact of the latter on the
former.
Table .3 provides some robustness tests. The first column in the table
shows the benchmark specification. The second model uses monthly (instead
of quarterly) time fixed effect. The rationale for the introduction of monthly
fixed effect is to control for unobservable variables at higher (than quarterly)
frequencies. In the third model, estimation is restricted to a smaller time
spell around the first 2 quarters of 2011 (from November 2010 to August
2011).5 The instruments are in fact defined only in a narrow time window
(February to August 2011) and it is compelling to assess estimation results
within this limited time frame. Despite the introduction of a set of lagged
endogenous and exogenous variables in the baseline specification, the use
of daily frequencies for estimation leaves the possibility of residual serial
correlation. The last column of Table .3 tests the robustness of results to
the use of standard errors robust to arbitrary serial correlation. The key
result survive this battery of tests. The use of month-fixed effects reduces
the point estimate of the target coefficient to 0.29.
5. The effect of bank default risk on sovereign’s
The previous sections described how Equation (1) can be identified by
using an ad hoc instrument constructed using the timeline of the US debt
ceiling crisis. Using these results and under some conditions, there is also
a chance to identify Equation (2). Let us consider again the system repre-
sented by Equation (1) and (2). The reduced form errors are
[
st
qt
]
−A−1φZt = A−1
[
vs,t
vq,t
]
(4)
where A =
[
1 −βs
−βq 1
]
. If the structural errors of Equations (1) and
(2) are uncorrelated, that is, if cov(vs,t, vq,t) = E(vs,t, vq,t) = 0, the reduced
form covariance matrix for the system of equations is
5The use of a longer time sample for the baseline estimation originates from the will-
ingness of comparing the IV coefficient with a corresponding OLS estimate assessed over
a sufficiently long period of time.
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Θˆ =
1
(1− βsβq)2
[
β2sσ
2
q + σ
2
s βsσ
2
q + βqσ
2
s
σ2q + β
2
qσ
2
s
]
(5)
If no knowledge about any of the structural parameters is available,
the problem of identification for Equations (1) and (2) can be seen as the
problem of finding a unique solution to a system of three quadratic equations
- linking the structural parameters and the known moment conditions to
the reduced form covariance matrix - comprising four unknowns: the two
structural parameters βs and βs and the two structural errors with variance
σ2s and σ
2
q . However, the ability to retrieve βs from the instrumental variable
estimation reduces the number of unknown to three. The possibility of
obtaining a unique solution to this system of equations in this case relies on
the introduction of trivial variance restrictions (such a positive value for the
structural variances) which may be enough to rule out one pair of solutions
for the system. The solution to the problem of identification of Equation
(2) can also be seen as follows: as the identification of Equations (1) via
instrument variables allows the identification of structural errors vs,t which
can then be considered as predetermined in the identification of Equation
(see Lahiri and Schmidt (1978), Hausman and Taylor (1983) and Hausman
et al. (1987) for more details).
Results for the key parameters in both equations Equation (1) and Equa-
tion (2) are reported in Table .4. The implied impact of bank CDSs on
sovereign credit risk is about 0.138, a value that corresponds to about a
third of the impact of sovereign on bank credit risk.
6. The cost of political uncertainty
The buyer of a credit swap receives a given contingent amount following a
credit event, such as a default. The contingent amount usually corresponds
to the difference between the face value of the underlying bond and its
market value at the time of default.6 As discussed in Duffie (1999) and Hull
and White (2000) if both CDS and cash bonds price default risk equally and
subject to possible arbitrage imperfections,7 the spread on the risky bond
over a risk-free should equal the CDS price.
6The principal amount minus the recovery rate times the sum of principal and accrued
interest on the reference obligation
7The spread on a par fixed-coupon risky bond over the par fixed-coupon risk-free bond
exactly equals the CDS price if the payment dates on the CDS and bond coincide, and
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Subject to the arbitrage imperfections the following approximate arbi-
trage relation between CDS and credit risk spreads should hold:
st ≈ yt − rt (6)
Estimates of the impact of sovereign credit risk on bank CDSs obtained
in the previous sections can the be used for a quantification of the additional
financing cost that the financial sector suffer following an increase in gov-
ernment credit risk. In detail, the overall impact of the debt ceiling debate
on bank 5-year CDSs can be retrieved by looking at the projection of the in-
strument identifying on disagreement among parties (z1) on US government
CDSs times the estimated impact of US sovereign on bank credit risk. Using
estimates from Model (2) in Table .2. In a back of the envelope calculation
the impact of the disagreement among the two US parties on US government
CDSs is 46 basis points,8 multiplying this figure times the estimated impact
on bank CDSs (0.385) we obtain an overall impact on bank CDSs of about
18 basis points. That is to say that US bank cost of capital has increased
of about 18 basis points over the risk free rate as a consequence of the debt
ceiling crisis. A similar figure can be obtained using Model (3) in Table .2.
7. Conclusions
This paper proposed an empirical characterization of the relationship
between sovereign and bank credit risk. The core of the empirical strategy
gravitated around the construction of an instrument for US sovereign default
risk, from the timeline of the US 2011 debt ceiling crisis. The use of a source
of variation for sovereign CDS that is exogenous to bank credit risk allows
the identification the causal impact of an increase of sovereign credit risk on
bank default probabilities. From a quantitative standpoint, an increase of
100 basis points in the US sovereign credit risk increases bank CDS by about
recovery on default is a constant fraction of face value (Houweling and Vorst (2002));
this is rarely the case. Also physically settled CDS prices may contain CTD premia, and
the arbitrage relation that should keep the two prices together may rely on short selling
the cash bond, possibility that is not always costless and indeed is sometimes not even
possible in illiquid bond markets. Nevertheless, Duffie (1999) and Hull and White (2000)
show that the relationship between CDS prices and the difference between corresponding
bond yields the the risk free tend to be reasonably accurate for assets trading close to par
when interest rates are not high and yield curves are relatively flat, as was the case of the
sample period used in this analysis.
80.051 x 9 episodes defining z1.
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41 basis points. The corresponding impact of bank CDS on US default risk is
instead 14 basis points. Two main results stand out from the analysis: first,
the relationship between bank and sovereign credit risk is primarily driven
by the effect of sovereign on bank. Second, almost half of any sovereign
credit risk shock is passed on to bank funding costs.
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Table .1: Debt ceiling timeline: How U.S. debt talks spiraled into crisis
Date Description Interpretation Expected effect
on US Gov. CDS
November 2, 2010 Republicans win control of the House of Repre-
sentatives on a promise to scale back government
spending and tackle budget deficits that have hov-
ered at their highest levels relative to the economy
since World War Two.
Framework (N/A)
January 6, April
4, and May 2,
2011
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner sends a let-
ter to Congress urging lawmakers to act soon to
increase the debt ceiling, warning that failure to
do so would be disastrous for the economy. In
January the Treasury estimates that U.S. borrow-
ing needs could push the amount of debt past the
legal borrowing limit of 14.294 trillion sometime
between March 31 and May 16.
Framework: the debt ceiling cri-
sis starts
(N/A)
January 28, 2011 Moody’s Investors Service states that it may place
a ”negative” outlook on the AAA rating of US
debt, as the country’s budget deficit widened.
Not strictly political thus ex-
cluded from the analysis
(N/A)
February 15, 2011 President Obama presented his budget proposal
for fiscal year 2012 on February 14. The following
day the the U.S. House Committee on the Bud-
get, strongly criticises the budget proposal with
a written letter for not doing enough to rein in
the rapidly expanding US deficit.The Senate will
reject the budget proposal on May 25.
Initial evidence of disagreement
between the parties
Positive
April 3, 2011 Republican Sen. John Cornyn, member of the
Senate Budget Committee, says he will not vote
to raise the debt ceiling unless it’s accompanied
by systematic reforms to address long-term spend-
ing and the national debt, voicing support for a
balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution
as a way to ensure the federal government lives
within its means ”instead of spending money we
don’t have.”
Initial evidence of disagreement
between the parties
Positive*
April 8, 2011 Democrats and Republicans narrowly avert a par-
tial shutdown of the federal government, agree-
ing on a budget deal and a short-term funding
extension a little more than an hour before the
clock strikes midnight and time runs out. The
new funding extension, which cuts spending by 2
billion USD, will last through the next week.
Difficult interoperation: the at-
tainment of an agreement par-
tially diffuse the risk of a de-
fault, however the effect is
only shot lived and the tim-
ing in which the agreement was
reached underscores the polit-
ical distance between the two
parties
Ambiguous
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Table .1: Debt ceiling timeline (Cont.)
Date Description Interpretation Expected effect
on US Gov. CDS
April 15, 2011 On a party-line vote 235-193, the House of Rep-
resentatives passed the Republican 2012 budget
proposalaimed to reduce total spending by 5.8 tril-
lion USD and reduce total deficits by 4.4 trillion
USD over 10 years compared to the current-policy
baseline.The measure, which Obama opposes, in-
cludes a radical overhaul of Medicare and Medi-
caid and it has virtually no chance of clearing the
Democratic-controlled Senate.
Difficult interpretation: while
showing commitment toward
finding a solution, the vote in
the House of Representatives,
also displays the unwillingness
of Republicans to compromise
and find a shared solution with
Democrats. But a shared so-
lution is necessary given the
Democratic-controlled Senate.
Ambiguous
April 18, 2011 Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services revises its
outlook on the US to negative due to recent and
expected further deterioration in the US fiscal pro-
file, and of the ability and willingness of the US
to soon reverse this trend. With the negative
outlook, S&P believed there is a likelihood of at
least one-in-three of a downward rating adjust-
ment within two years.
Not strictly political thus ex-
cluded from the analysis.
(N/A)
May 16, 2011 The debt ceiling is reached. Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner issued adebt issuance suspen-
sion period, directing the Treasury to utilise ”ex-
traordinary measures” to fund federal obligations.
Not clear interpretation: hav-
ing reached the debt ceiling
stresses the urgency of action,
however the extraordinary mea-
sures adopted by the Treasury
buy more time for reaching an
agreement.
Ambiguous
May 18, 2011 Bipartisan deficit-reduction talks among the
”Gang of Six” high-profile Senators are suspended
when RepublicanTom Coburndrops out.
Evidence of disagreement be-
tween the parties; a biparti-
san solution is the only viable
option given the split in the
Congress.
Positive
May 24, 2011 House Republicans says that they would allow a
vote next week on an increase in the federal debt
ceiling with no strings attached, in order to see it
defeated and show Democrats that no increase in
federal borrowing authority can be enacted with-
out significant spending cuts. Calling the vote a
stunt, leading Democrats said that having a debt-
ceiling vote that was intended to fail was irrespon-
sible and could rattle an already anxious financial
community.
Evidence of persistent disagree-
ment between the parties.
Positive
May 25, 2011 The Senate rejected both the Republican House
budget proposal, by a vote of 57-40, and the
Obama budget proposal, by a vote of 97-0.
Evidence of persistent disagree-
ment between the parties.
Positive
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Table .1: Debt ceiling timeline (Cont)
Date Description Interpretation Expected effect
on US Gov. CDS
May 31, 2011 The House voted on a bill to raise the debt ceiling
without any spending cuts tied to the increase.
The bill, which would have raised the debt ceil-
ing by 2.4trillion USD, failed by a vote of 97-318.
Democrats accused Republicans of playing poli-
tics by holding a vote they knew would fail.
Evidence of persistent disagree-
ment between the parties.
Positive
June 23, 2011 Biden’s negotiations on the debt ceiling were
helted when both Eric Cantor and Jon Kyl walk
out over disagreements on taxes.
Evidence of persistent disagree-
ment between the parties.
Positive
June 30, 2011 The Senate plans to forgo its scheduled recess for
the week of July 4th to work on legislation to raise
the debt ceiling and cut the deficit. Senate Ma-
jority Leader Harry Reid announces the Senate
will take the Independence Day holiday off but
will return to work on July 5 after Obama crit-
icises lawmakers and urges them to cancel vaca-
tions. Democratic legislators discuss a scaled-back
deal that would avert default but force Congress
to tackle the debt ceiling issue again before the
2012 elections.
The episode shows the commit-
ment of the Senate to reach an
agreement.
Negative
July 7, 2011 After hosting lawmakers at White House, Obama
says Republicans and Democrats are still far apart
on many issues but that all agree on the need to
raise the debt ceiling.
Evidence of persistent disagree-
ment between the parties.
Positive
July 9, 2011 Boehner says a ”grand bargain” is out of reach
because Republicans will not accept the tax in-
creases Democrats are demanding, and he calls
for a more modest 2 trillion USD package that
would rely mostly on spending cuts.
Evidence of persistent disagree-
ment between the parties about
the ”grand bargain”, involv-
ing savings up to 4 trillion
USD; however Boehner declara-
tion shows commitment to find
a more limited deal.
Ambiguous
July 10, 2011 President Obama meets with congressional lead-
ers at the White House. At one point, the
talks get heated between House Majority Leader
Eric Cantor and the President. Multiple sources,
speaking on condition of anonymity, say President
Obama tells the gathering that ”this could bring
my presidency down,” referring to his pledge to
veto any short-term extension of the debt ceiling.
Sources say he vows, ”I will not yield on this.”
Cantor tells reporters after the meeting that he
proposed a short-term agreement to raise the fed-
eral debt ceiling, a position President Obama has
previously rejected.
Evidence of persistent disagree-
ment between the parties
Positive*
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Table .1: Debt ceiling timeline (Cont.)
Date Description Interpretation Expected effect
on US Gov. CDS
July 19, 2011 The Gang of Six resurfaces with a deficit reduc-
tion plan that proposes 3.75 trillion USD in sav-
ings over 10 years and contains 1.2 trillion USD
in new revenues. The Republican Majority in
the House brought theCut, Cap and Balance Act
(H.R.2560),their proposed solution to the crisis,
to a vote. They passed the bill by a vote of 234-
190, split closely along party lines: 229 Republi-
cans and 5 Democrats ’for’, 181 Democrats and
9 Republicans ’against’; it was sent to the Sen-
ate for consideration. The Bill authorised that
the debt ceiling be raised by 2.4 trillion USD af-
teraBalanced Budget Amendmentwas passed by
Congress.2
Evidence of progress toward the
rising the debt ceiling
Negative
July 21, 2011 Obama and Boehner are reported to be discussing
a 3 trillion USD deficit-cutting deal. Obama
stresses some revenues will need to be included
in any accord. Obama meets with congressional
Democratic leaders at the White House, but there
are no reports of a breakthrough.
Despite the efforts between the
two parties, no agreement is
reached
Positive
July 31, 2011 Obama announces a deal between his administra-
tion and congressional leaders has been reached.
The agreement, which still requires congressional
approval, proposes a two-stage process. In the
first stage, it includes 917 billion USD in spend-
ing cuts and other deficit reduction now, as well
as a 900 billion USD increase in the debt ceiling.
In the second stage, a special joint committee of
Congress will recommend further deficit reduction
steps totalling 1.5 trillion USD or more by the end
of November, with Congress obligated to vote on
the proposals by the end of the year.
Solution to debt ceiling crisis
approaches.
Negative*
August 1, 2011 The U.S. House passes the debt ceiling deal
that the White House and congressional leaders
reached the previous day. The Senate will approve
the measures the following day.
The debt ceiling crisis is over. Negative
1The CBO analysis, released in April 2011, estimated that the budget would increase total deficits over 10 years by 2.7 trillion USD:
from 6.7 trillion USD of the March 2011 baseline to 9.4 trillion USD with the proposed budget. 2Since Constitutional amendments
require a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers of Congress to pass, a vote for a Balanced Budget Amendment would require
more support than the Cut, Cap and Balance Act bill achieved in the House vote. ∗Event happened outside trading hours; effect
imputed on the following Monday. This timeline constructed using the online news archives of AFP, CNN, the New York Times,
the Los Angeles Times and Reuters.
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Table .2: Bank CDS and government credit risk
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank CDS Bank CDS Gov.CDS Bank CDS Gov.CDS
Gov. CDS 0.519∗∗ 0.385∗ 0.410∗
(0.185) (0.235) (0.237)
L.Bank CDS 0.904∗∗ 0.913∗∗ -0.002 0.904∗∗ -0.002
(0.029) (0.029) (0.004) (0.029) (0.004)
L.Gov. CDS -0.478∗∗ -0.365∗∗ 0.917∗∗ -0.378∗∗ 0.917∗∗
(0.163) (0.224) (0.023) (0.225) (0.022)
VIX 0.593∗∗ 0.595∗∗ 0.016 0.594∗∗ 0.016
(0.063) (0.063) (0.013) (0.063) (0.013)
L.VIX -0.449∗∗ -0.449∗∗ -0.009 -0.450∗∗ -0.009
(0.062) (0.062) (0.012) (0.062) (0.012)
Baa-Aaa Corporate Bond Spread 0.029 0.031 0.004 0.029 0.003
(0.056) (0.056) (0.012) (0.056) (0.012)
z1 (disagreement)
1 0.051∗∗
(0.012)
z2 (agreement)
2 -0.044∗∗
(0.011)
z3 (z1 − z2) 0.049∗∗
(0.009)
Underidentification test3 0.0105 0.0025
Weak identification test4 19.030 30.640
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043
The table presents the regression results for the relationship between bank and sovereign 5
year CDSs. The first equation shows results for a standard OLS regression, models 2-4 and 3-5
are respectively the second and first step regressions of IV-GMM models where US sovereign
CDS are instrumented with a variable constructed from the calendar dates of the 2010 US
debt ceiling crisis. Daily frequencies from 01-01-2008 to 30-12-2011. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. 1 the first instrument is a dummy variable identifying dates characterised
by events denoting political disagreement over the increase of the debt ceiling.2the second
instrument identifies all dates characterised by events denoting political agreement over the
increase of the debt ceiling 3Chi-sq(2) P-val. (4)Stock-Yogo critical values for % 10 maximal
IV size is 19.93 for Model (3) and 16.38 for Model (5).∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Table .3: Bank CDS and government credit risk, robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank CDS Bank CDS Bank CDS Bank CDS
Gov. CDS 0.410∗ 0.295∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.410∗
(0.237) (0.169) (0.211) (0.237)
L.Bank CDS 0.904∗∗ 0.830∗∗ 0.933∗∗ 0.904∗∗
(0.030) (0.038) (0.048) (0.030)
L.Gov. CDS -0.378∗ -0.412∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -0.378∗
(0.225) (0.181) (0.151) (0.225)
VIX 0.594∗∗ 0.613∗∗ 0.386∗∗ 0.594∗∗
(0.063) (0.065) (0.057) (0.063)
L.VIX -0.450∗∗ -0.343∗∗ -0.284∗∗ -0.450∗∗
(0.062) (0.065) (0.057) (0.062)
BAA-AAA Corporate Bond Spread 0.029 -0.116 0.082 0.029
(0.056) (0.093) (0.054) (0.056)
Fixed-effects Quarter Month Quarter Quarter
Time Sample 01/08-12/11 01/08-12/11 11/10-08/11 01/08-12/11
Serial Correlation Robust SE No No No Yes
Observations 1043 1039 159 1043
Adjusted R2 0.886 0.756 0.935 0.886
The first model represents the baseline specification, the remaining equations test result robustness
to different time fixed effects (Model 2), time sample (Model 3), and specification for the standard
error. Daily frequencies from 01-01-2008 to 31-10-2011. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05
Table .4: Bank sovereign credit risk nexus: structural parameters
Paramter Structural estimate
Effect of Government CDSs on banks’s (βs) 0.410
Effect of bank CDSs on government’s (βq) 0.138
Variance of government CDSs (σs) 0.00044
Variance of bank CDSs (σq) 0.00052
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